[Purposes] This paper aims to promote the construction of smart sites and accelerate the transformation and upgrading of enterprise construction methods. [Methods] Evolutionary game theory and system dynamics (SD) method were introduced to build an SD-based evolutionary game model for government and enterprise participation behaviors in smart site construction. On the basis of an in-depth discussion on the mechanism of government subsidies and enterprise participation in smart site construction, the initial strategy and external variables of the system were simulated. [Findings] The research shows that there is an evolutionary stable equilibrium in the behavioral game of government and enterprise participation in smart site construction, and the final stable state of the system is related to the initial proportion of the selection strategy of both parties’ interest subjects. In addition, there is a threshold of government subsidies. [Conclusions]The participation willingness of government and enterprise affects each other. When the government chooses an active subsidy strategy, it has a positive effect on the development of smart site construction, but the subsidy range requires reasonable control to prevent negative effects.