[Purposes] For the convenience of road traffic safety management departments to more effectively carry out traffic violation control, curb implicit illegal behaviors in road traffic, and achieve orderly, safe and smooth road traffic. [Methods] Traffic illegal behaviors, such as drunk driving and driving without a license, which cannot be implemented online through video surveillance facilities, are defined as implicit traffic illegal behaviors. Model the decision-making interaction between drivers and traffic law enforcement through signaling game theory. A detector mechanism is introduced in the model to enable law-executors to make decisions based on the output of the detector and driver signals. The confusion equilibrium strategy and quasi-separation equilibrium strategy of both sides of the game are deduced, revealing the equilibrium strategy changes of drivers and traffic enforcers under different prior probabilities. [Findings] The simulation results show that the tendency of the enforcer to form two kinds of trust degree and the quality of trust degree have an important influence on the prior probability interval for drivers to choose a pure strategy, the probability for drivers to show their actual type and the equilibrium utility of the enforcer. [Conclusions] Based on the signaling game model and from the perspective of the decision-making mechanism of law enforcement, this paper puts forward some specific suggestions on the governance of road traffic recessive illegal behaviors.