长沙理工大学学报(自然科学版)
考虑服从率的道路网络交通流逐日演化博弈模型
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作者单位:

(长沙理工大学 交通运输工程学院,湖南 长沙 410114)

作者简介:

黄中祥(1965-),男,湖南汨罗人,长沙理工大学教授,主要从事交通运输规划与管理等方面的研究。

通讯作者:

黄中祥(1966-),男,湖南汨罗人,长沙理工大学教授,主要从事交通运输规划与管理等方面的研究。

中图分类号:

U 49 1.1

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金资助项目(51338002,51978082)


Day-to-day evolutionary game model of road network traffic flow considering traveler’s compliant rate
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Affiliation:

(School of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, Changsha University of Science and Technology, Changsha 410114, China)

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    摘要:

    在刻画出行者的日常路径选择过程中,出行者的异质性与有限理性问题逐渐突出,而以往的交通流演化研究大多将出行者根据是否装配先进出行者信息系统(ATIS)分为两类,演化稳定后分别达到UE与SUE状态,但没有考虑出行者对信息的服从率。因此,研究中根据出行者对静态信息的服从率将出行者分为三类,使用累积前景理论刻画出行者的得失心理行为,建立了基于马尔可夫动态模拟出行者路径选择的演化博弈模型。在算例试验中,分析了路径调整率分别取固定值和变动值条件下的演化过程,当路径调整率的取值随演化过程递减时,出行者由更期望改变自己的路径选择逐渐向保持原有路径选择改变,这能更加体现出行者的有限理性,其路径演化过程也更加符合实际。

    Abstract:

    In the process of describing traveler's routine choice, the heterogeneity and bounded rationality of travelers have become increasingly prominent. In the past, most studies on the traffic flow evolution divided travelers into two categories according to whether travelers were equipped with Advanced Traveler Information System(ATIS). After the evolution was stable, they reached the UE and SUE states respectively, but those studies did not consider the traveler's compliance rate with information. Therefore, according to the compliance rate of static information, the travelers are divided into three categories. The Cumulative Prospect Theory is used to describe the behavior of the traveler's gains and losses. An evolutionary game model based on Markov dynamic simulation of traveler's route choice is established. In the experiment of the example, the evolution process of the path adjustment rate under the condition of fixed value and variable value is analyzed. When the value of the path adjustment rate decreases with the evolution process, travelers gradually change their path choice from thinking more about changing their own path choice to keeping the original path choice. This can further reflect the bounded rationality of the traveler, and the path evolution process is more realistic.

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引用本文

黄中祥,陈思臣.考虑服从率的道路网络交通流逐日演化博弈模型[J].长沙理工大学学报(自然科学版),2020,17(1):8-15.
HUANG Zhong-xiang, CHEN Si-chen, CHEN Si-chen. Day-to-day evolutionary game model of road network traffic flow considering traveler’s compliant rate[J]. Journal of Changsha University of Science & Technology (Natural Science),2020,17(1):8-15.

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  • 在线发布日期: 2022-02-26
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